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Abstract
We introduce a novel certification method for parametrized perturbations by generaliz-
ing randomized smoothing. Using this method, we construct a provable classifier that can
establish state-of-the-art robustness against semantic perturbations including geometric trans-
formations (e.g., rotation, translation), for different types of interpolation, and, for the first
time, volume changes on audio data. Our experimental results indicate that the method is
practically effective: for ResNet-50 on ImageNet, it achieves rotational robustness provable
up to ±30◦ for 28% of images.
1 Introduction
Deep neural networks are vulnerable to adversarial examples (Szegedy et al., 2014) – semantical
preserving changes such as `p-noise, geometrical perturbations (e.g., rotations and translation)
(Engstrom et al., 2017), and Wasserstein perturbations (Wong et al., 2019) which can affect the
output of the network in undesirable ways. This is especially problematic when these models are
used in safety critical tasks such as medical diagnosis (Amato et al., 2013) or autonomous driving
(Bojarski et al., 2016).
As a result, recent work (e.g., Gehr et al. (2018); Weng et al. (2018)) started investigating
robustness certification methods which guarantee the absence of adversarial examples. However,
even with training methods tailored to produce networks amenable to `∞-certification (Wong &
Kolter, 2018; Mirman et al., 2018), current verification techniques still cannot scale to realistic
models and datasets. Recently, a promising approach called randomized smoothing was proposed
by (Cohen et al., 2019) – it works by constructing a probabilistic classifier with probabilistic
certificates and produces state-of-the-art results for `2-norm bounded noise on ImageNet.
This work In this work we generalize randomized smoothing to parameterized semantic per-
turbations (beyond `p). For example, our method enables probabilistic certification of geometric
perturbations (e.g., rotations, translations), which is challenging due to the need for interpolation
and rounding. Prior work on this topic is limited in either expressivity or scalability: Pei et al.
(2017) is restricted to the nearest neighbor interpolation and exhaustive enumeration, while Singh
et al. (2019); Balunovic et al. (2019) allow more complex interpolations (e.g., bilinear, bicubic)
but handle only smaller networks. Our generalization of randomized smoothing overcomes these
limitations: it enables certification of geometric perturbations on large networks and with com-
plex interpolations. We illustrate the idea in Fig. 1 where we sample different angles and, by our
theorem, obtain a robustness certificate for rotations. Crucially, to be sound, this certificate takes
into account the interpolation error, which we overcome by incorporating a `p-certified classifier.
We remark that to model a realistic attacker, our method also considers quantization errors
from limited precision and does not rely on continuous pixel values. This is important as it means
the method is sound for pixel values that are integers or floats (which is how images are actually
represented).
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Figure 1: A network classifies an image correctly, but fails to classify the same image rotated by
γ. Our method creates and certifies a smoothed classifier, by sampling rotations.
Main contributions Our key contributions are:
• A generalization of randomized smoothing to parameterized semantic perturbations.
• The first scalable and sound certification method for semantic perturbations, such as rota-
tions and translations, that can be applied to ImageNet images. The method is general and
works with any standard interpolation (e.g., bicubic, bilinear) and types of pixel values (e.g.,
integers, floats).
• A thorough evaluation of the proposed method on image and audio datasets, establishing
state-of-the art results in both domains.
2 Related Work
We now survey the most closely related work in exact and probabilistic certification, defenses as
well as perturbations and certification beyond `p norm-based noise.
`p norm based certification and defenses The discovery of adversarial examples (Szegedy
et al., 2014; Biggio et al., 2013) triggered interest in training robust neural networks. Empirical
defenses are a common way to harden a model against an attacker, by adversarially attacking
images during training (Kurakin et al., 2017; Madry et al., 2018). However, while adversarially
trained networks may be robust to adversaries, the robustness usually cannot be formally verified
with current verification methods. This is because complete methods (Ehlers, 2017; Katz et al.,
2017; Bunel et al., 2018) do not scale and non-complete methods relying on over approximation
lose too much precision and cannot prove true properties (Gehr et al., 2018; Wang et al., 2018;
Weng et al., 2018; Raghunathan et al., 2018a; Singh et al., 2019; Salman et al., 2019b).
To address this issue, provable training methods have been developed, aimed at producing
networks that are amenable for certification (Mirman et al., 2018; Raghunathan et al., 2018b;
Wang et al., 2018; Wong & Kolter, 2018; Gowal et al., 2018; Balunovic & Vechev, 2020). Currently,
these methods do not scale to train large enough networks with state-of-the-art accuracy (e.g.,
ImageNet).
Recently, randomized smoothing was introduced, which could for the first time, certify a
(smoothed) classifier against substantial norm bound `2 noise on ImageNet (Lecuyer et al., 2018;
Li et al., 2018; Cohen et al., 2019; Salman et al., 2019a; Zhai et al., 2020), by relaxing exact
certificates to high confidence probabilistic ones. Smoothing has the advantage that it scales to
large models, however, it can suffer from an added overhead during inference time, and is currently
limited to norm-based perturbations.
Semantic perturbations Transformations, such as translations and rotation, can produce ad-
versarial examples (Engstrom et al., 2017; Kanbak et al., 2018). Pei et al. (2017) were first to
certify against such semantic preserving operations on images by enumeration. They reduce the
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Algorithm 1 for certification
# certify the robustness of g around x
function Certify(f , x, n0, n, α, ψ)
counts0← Sample(f, x, n0, ψ)
cˆA ← top index in counts0
counts← Sample(f, x, n, ψ)
pA ← LBound(counts[cˆA], n, 1− α)
if pA >
1
2 return cˆA and r
else return ABSTAIN Figure 2: Rotations with interpolation RI do not com-
pose.
search space by only considering next neighbor interpolation. However, enumeration does not
scale to continuous interpolations or fine-grained encodings, such as volume changes of 16-bit
audio data. Singh et al. (2019) were the first to support certification of rotations for bilinear inter-
polation, which was significantly improved on by (Balunovic et al., 2019). Both methods generate
linear relaxations and propagate them through the network. However, these methods do not yet
scale to large networks (i.e., ResNet-50) or complex data sets (i.e., ImageNet). We remark that
this work is a continuation of our prior work (Fischer et al., 2020).
3 Background
We now discuss the necessary background on both randomized smoothing and interpolation.
Randomized smoothing A smoothed classifier g can be constructed out of an ordinary clas-
sifier f mapping points in Rm to labels in Y, by calculating the most probable result of f(x + β)
where β ∼ N (0, σ21):
g(x) := arg max
c
Pβ∼N (0,σ21)(f(x + β) = c).
In practice, it is intractable to calculate the probabilities analytically, hence we estimate the inte-
gral up to a chosen confidence by sampling. One then obtains the following robustness guarantee:
Theorem 3.1. Suppose cA ∈ Y, pA, pB ∈ [0, 1]. If
Pβ(f(x + β) = cA) ≥ pA ≥ pB ≥ max
c6=cA
Pβ(f(x + β) = c),
then g(x+ γ) = cA for all γ satisfying
‖γ‖2 < r`2 = σ2 (Φ−1(pA)− Φ−1(pB)).
In practice we use Algorithm 1 with ψβ(x) := (x+ β) in order to obtain the above guarantee.
We say we “smooth” over a variable γ or a classifier f when we apply Certify.
Interpolation and rounding Applying a geometric transformation (e.g., rotation) results in
a transformed pixel grid which does not align with the original one. Thus, to obtain the pixel
values of the transformed image, interpolation is needed. Typical interpolation algorithms for
images include nearest-neighbor interpolation, bilinear interpolation and bicubic interpolation (see
Appendix A for details).
We denote the rotation Rβ by an angle β and subsequent interpolation I of an image x ∈ Rn
by RIβ(x). The interpolation step I consists of resampling (the actual interpolation e.g., bilinear)
and rounding the pixel values back to the used underlying data type (e.g., integers in {0, . . . , 255}).
It is important to note that rotations with interpolation do not compose, that is, RIβ ◦RIγ 6= RIβ+γ .
This is because rotation and interpolation with rounding do not commute (Fig. 2).
Similarly to images, when transforming a 16-bit audio signal, the result can be in floating point
space. Thus, it needs to be rounded to be expressible in 16-bit integers again, which introduces
rounding errors.
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Figure 3: Outline of our approach. We rotate the input by βi ∼ N (0, σ2) degrees, i ∈ {1, . . . , nγ},
apply preprocessing, and classify them. This allows us to certify robustness against an attacker
who can rotate the input up to ±rγ degrees.
Figure 4: In the outline (Fig. 3) we use a certified classifier to handle interpolation noise; here
randomized smoothing.
4 Generalization of Smoothing
We now generalize randomized smoothing (Cohen et al., 2019) to parameterized transformations.
We consider composable transformations ψβ : Rn → Rn, that is, we have that ψβ ◦ ψγ = ψβ+γ for
β, γ ∈ Rd. We will show in Section 5 how to handle non-composable transformations.
Definition 4.1. Given a base classifier f : Rm → Y and a transformation ψβ : Rn → Rm, we
define a smoothed classifier g : Rn → Y by
g(x) = arg max
c
Pβ ∼ N (0,σ21) (f ◦ ψβ(x) = c) .
We now obtain the following robustness guarantee:
Theorem 4.2. Let x ∈ Rn, f : Rm → Y be a classifier and ψβ : Rn → Rm be a composable
transformation as above. If
Pβ(f ◦ ψβ(x) = cA) = pA ≥ pA ≥ pB ≥ pB = max
cB 6=cA
Pβ(f ◦ ψβ(x) = cB),
then g ◦ ψγ(x) = cA for all γ satisfying
‖γ‖2 < σ2 (Φ−1(pA)− Φ−1(pB)) =: rγ .
The proof is similar to the one by Cohen et al. (2019) and is given in Appendix B. The key
difference to Cohen et al. (2019) is that we allow parameterized transformations ψ, while Cohen
et al. (2019) only allows additive noise.
Lemma 4.3. If we replace f with a classifier fˆ , behaving with probability (1 − ρ) the same as f
and with probability ρ differently than f and if
Pβ,fˆ (fˆ ◦ ψβ(x) = cA) ≥ p′A ≥ p′B ≥ maxcB 6=cA Pβ,fˆ (fˆ ◦ ψβ(x) = cB),
then g ◦ ψγ(x) = cA for all γ satisfying
‖γ‖2 < σ
2
(Φ−1(p′A − ρ)− Φ−1(pB + ρ)).
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Proof. By applying the union bound we can relate the output probability p of f for a class c with
the output probability of fˆ and p′:
p′ := Pβ,fˆ (fˆ ◦ ψβ(x) = c)
= Pβ,fˆ
(
(f ◦ ψβ(x) = c) ∨ (fˆ error)
)
≤ Pβ(f ◦ ψβ(x) = c) + Pfˆ (fˆ error)
= p+ ρ
Thus we can obtain new bounds pA ≥ p′A − ρ and pB ≤ p′B + ρ from p′A and p′B measured on fˆ .
Plugging these bounds in Theorem 4.2 yields the result.
This lemma allows us to smooth over erroneous classifiers like already smoothed classifiers.
Similar to (Cohen et al., 2019), both Theorem 4.2 and Lemma 4.3 can be instantiated with
pB = 1− pA to obtain rγ = σΦ−1(pA) and rγ = σΦ−1(p′A − ρ), respectively.
In practice, both statements hold with a certain probability as we have a finite amount of
samples to estimate a lower bound of pA, pA and an upper bound of pB , pB . Algorithm 1 shows
the Certify procedure, which can be used to perform this in practice. The LBound method uses
Clopper-Pearson bounds to estimate pA with confidence 1−α. The given algorithm returns either
both a class and a radius r if pA >
1
2 , or abstains from classification. To perform inference with
g, it suffices to pick fewer samples and perform a statistical test with confidence 1 − α whether
more samples of class cA than class cB got selected.
5 Semantic Perturbations
We now discuss several practical semantic perturbations ψβ , first in an idealized setting, that is,
without interpolation or rounding, after which we explain how to handle these in the realistic case.
5.1 Idealized Setting
Rotation Rotations Rβ by an angle β ∈ R compose:
ψβ ◦ ψγ(x) = Rβ ◦Rγ(x) = Rβ+γ(x) = ψβ+γ(x).
Many other geometric transformations such as translations and scaling also compose.
Volume The volume of an audio signal can be changed by multiplying the signal with a constant.
In order to change the signal x by β (measured in decibel [β] = dB) we multiply x by 10β/20.
Thus the transformation is ψβ(x) := 10
β/20 · x, which also composes:
ψβ ◦ ψγ(x) = 10(β+γ)/20 · x = ψβ+γ(x).
5.2 Realistic setting
We illustrate the difficulties introduced by handling interpolation using the example of interpola-
tion with rotation. Our proposed method works with all interpolations. Rounding errors can be
handled analogously.
Interpolation and rounding error Recall that rotation with interpolation does not compose
(Fig. 2). Thus smoothing with realistic rotations ψβ := R
I
β is not enough as this would not
compose with an attacker performing realistic rotations ψγ := R
I
γ of an angle γ. To address this,
we regard the difference between RIβ ◦RIγ (x) and RIβ+γ(x) as noise:
(β, γ,x) := RIβ ◦RIγ (x)−RIβ+γ(x),
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with ‖(β, γ,x)‖2 ≤ E for some E ∈ R (computation of E is discussed Section 6).
The key idea is to smooth out (with rotations) a classifier f (Fig. 4) that is certifiably robust
against `2 noise (Fig. 3). For ψβ := Rβ (without I) and base classifier f ◦ I, we can apply
Theorem 4.2 to
g(x) := arg max
c
Pβ(f ◦ ψβ(x) = c ∧ f is robust on BE(ψβ(x))),
where BE(x) := {y ∈ Rm | ‖x − y‖2 ≤ E}, and obtain the guarantee that for all (mathematical)
rotations Rγ satisfying ‖γ‖2 < R, by using
ψβ ◦Rγ = I ◦Rβ ◦Rγ = I ◦Rβ+γ = ψβ+γ ,
that
Pβ(f ◦ ψβ+γ(x) = cA ∧ f is robust on BE(ψβ+γ(x))) > max
B 6=A
pB .
Because f is robust around ψβ+γ(x), we know that adding  s.t. ‖‖2 < E does not change the
class cA predicted by f . Thus we get
Pβ(f(R
I
β+γ(x) + ) = cA for all  ∈ BE(0)) > max
B 6=A
pB .
Here, the statement also holds for the specific , namely (β, γ,x) ∈ BE(0), resulting in
Pβ(f(R
I
β+γ(x) + (β, γ,x)) = cA) > max
B 6=A
pB ,
which can be rewritten using the definition of (β, γ,x) to obtain the desired safety property
Pβ(f ◦RIβ ◦RIγ (x) = cA) > max
B 6=A
pB .
6 Certification of Classifiers
We next explain how to apply the discussed techniques in practice, so to obtain robustness cer-
tificates against rotations. Other transformations (e.g., translations) work analogously.
Attacker Model and Calculating E A key to our proposed approach is to find a good bound
E. For arbitrary images, the norm of the interpolation error (β, γ, x) can be large, but for realistic
images x ∼ D, where D is the data distribution, the norm is typically lower. To exploit this, we
give probabilistic bounds on the norm for (β, γ, x).
In this work we assume an attacker that applies a rotation of angle γ ∈ C. We can pick a
suitable σ and compute a probabilistic upper bound E by computing
qE := Pβ∼N (0,σ21),γ∼U(C),x∼D(‖(β, γ, x)‖2 < E),
where U(C) describes the uniform distribution over C. Using the Clopper-Pearson interval, we
can estimate a lower bound of qE for a given E with confidence αE , i.e., P(qE ≤ qE) ≤ 1− αE .
Using this qE provides a sound certification against an attacker that chooses the angle rotation
angle randomly. To defend a against a malicous attacker one needs to bound
q′E := Pβ∼N (0,σ21),x∼D(max
γ∈C
‖(β, γ, x)‖2 < E),
which can be achieved by using a similar approach to Balunovic et al. (2019) (Appendix A.4):
The range C can be divided into small intervals [γi, γi+1] and subsequently used to calculate an
interval over approximation capturing all images obtained through rotations by angles in [γi, γi+1]
using interval analysis. From these over approximations we can then directly obtain can upper
bound for maxγ∈[γi,γi+1] ‖(β, γ, x)‖2, where β and x can be sampled as before.
We note that these bounds can be obtained through precomputation on the data set.
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Figure 5: Difference between one rotation and two consecutive rotations. With out vignetting
(upper row) and with vignetting (lower row).
6.1 Preprocessing to reduce E
Because the estimates of E at a satisfactory error rate qE are still larger than the radii most
certification methods can certify, we add preprocessing to the images before the classifier f classifies
them.
Low-pass filter Commonly, noise is a high-frequency artifact in the data. As interpolation noise
behaves similarly, we choose a low-pass filter (blur) as pre-processing, to reduce the norm bound
E the classifier needs to handle. The low-pass filter (i) calculates the two dimensional discrete
fourier transform, (ii) filters the calculated frequencies by discarding the highest frequencies (thus
part of the noise) up to a threshold and (iii) calculates the inverse two dimensional discrete fourier
transform on the filtered frequencies.
Vignetting Another issue impacting E is that rotation of a digital image induces black corners
to the image. Thus rotating twice can lead to very large `2 differences. To sidestep this issue we
introduce a second pre-processing step, namely vignetting, which sets the pixel values of all pixels
outside a circle to 0. This significantly reduces the interpolation error (β, γ, x) as can be seen in
Fig. 5.
6.2 Smoothing smoothed classifiers
The only certification method able to handle noise large enough for our setting currently is ran-
domized smoothing. Thus we need to smoothen (Fig. 3) over an already smoothed classifier
(Fig. 4).
Double-smoothing To do that, we invoke Algorithm 1 twice in order to smooth the smoothed
classifier. The Sample procedure of the outer classifier (Fig. 3), which smooths the angle γ,
invokes the Certify procedure of the inner classifier Fig. 4, which smooths the interpolation
noise (β, γ, x). To clarify the notation, we add the subscript γ and  to the variables of the
algorithm.
To obtain the certified radius rγ we need to smooth γ with nγ samples, and for each of these
samples we need to smooth the interpolation noise (β, γ, x) with n samples. While this can
amount to a very large number of samples (nγ ·n), we find that relatively few samples in practice
suffice to guarantee rγ with high confidence 1 − αγ . The constants n0,γ and n0, can be chosen
small compared to nγ and n and thus we neglect its cost.
Smoothing over probably certified classifiers Since both the bound E and the underlying
classifier are probabilistic in nature, we need to use Lemma 4.3 to consider the cases in which the
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base classifier can be wrong. This is the case if the guaranteed radius of the classifier is incorrect
or the bound E is incorrect. Thus,
ρ = P(f not robust on BpE(ψβ+γ(x)))
= P(guarantee of f wrong ∨ E wrong for ψβ+γ(x))
≤ P(guarantee of f wrong ) + P( E wrong for ψβ+γ(x))
≤ α + qE + αE
where 1 − α is the confidence of the base classifier, qE is the probabilistic guarantee for E and
1− αE is the confidence with which E was obtained.
6.3 k-smoothing
For some data sets (i.e., CIFAR-10), the bounds for E, even after preprocessing (low-pass filter
and vignetting) are not small enough to produce satisfactory results. Interpolation noise usually is
not concentrated, similarly to `∞ noise. While it would at first sight make sense to use certification
methods to certify against `∞ noise, currently, there is no method that can directly certify CIFAR-
10 against `∞ noise up to 28/255 to a satisfactory degree for an accurate model. Thus we certify
against `2 noise.
Noise partitioning To improve this, instead of calculating an `2 bound E on the noise, we
calculate two `2 bounds: EL for the noise on the left half of the image, and ER, for the noise on
the right part of the image. First, we split the noise (β, γ,x) into the noise L(β, γ,x) applied to
the left side of the image x, and into the noise R(β, γ,x) applied to the right side of the image
such that
(β, γ,x) = L(β, γ,x) + R(β, γ,x).
Next, we estimate the upper bounds EL for L(β, γ,x) and ER for R(β, γ,x). Lastly, we construct
a classifier f1 that certifies ER and then use this as a base classifier to construct f2, which certifies
EL. Thus f2 is certified for both EL and ER. Formally, the outer classifier is
g(x) = arg max
c
Pβ(f2 ◦ ψβ(x) = c ∧ f2 is robust on BLEL ∧ f2 is robust on BRER),
where f2 is the double smoothed classifier (by Lemma 4.3) which smooths the left and right side
noise consecutively
f2(x) = arg max
c
PL(f1(x+ L) = c ∧ f1 is robust on BRER(x+ L)),
where again, f1(x) = arg maxc PR(f(x + R) = c). Here, f denotes the base classifier we
smooth over.
Benefit of noise partitioning If the noise is evenly spread then the `2 norm of the left (right)
half of the noise is 1√
2
‖(β, γ, x)‖2. Thus, we improve by a factor of 1√2 . One can also partition
the image differently, i.e., color-channels or quadrants and smooth over each part in composition.
The number we need to sample in the case for rotations, is nγ to smooth γ; for each of these nγ
samples we need to smooth L(β, γ, x) using nL samples and again for each of these samples, we
need to smooth R(β, γ, x) using nR samples. Thus, in total, we need nγ · nL · nR samples.
7 Evaluation
We now present a through evaluation of our proposed method, showing results for rotations,
translations and audio volume change. All experiments were performed on a machine with 2
GeForce RTX 2080 Tis and a 16-core Intel(R) Core(TM) i9-9900K CPU @ 3.60GHz.
8
Table 1: Bound E for the interpolation error of rotations. All errors are estimated with αE = 0.001.
We used C = [−180, 180] for MNIST and C = [−30, 30], σ = 30 for the others. ∗ indicates the
highest observed error during sampling. On MNIST and ImageNet we calculated E on the whole
image, while on CIFAR and GTSRB we calculated the error component per color channel. Values
for Restricted ImageNet are ommited as they are similar to those for ImageNet.
Dataset I E qE
MNIST bil. 0.3 98.68
MNIST bic 0.3 99.25
ImageNet bil. 0.95 99.21
ImageNet bil. 1.45∗ 99.99
ImageNet bic. 0.95 98.28
ImageNet bic. 1.46∗ 99.99
ImageNet near. 0.95 96.41
ImageNet near. 3.58∗ 99.99
Dataset I ER qER EG qEG EB qEB
CIFAR bil. 0.25 96.75 0.25 96.83 0.25 96.90
CIFAR bil. 0.43∗ 99.99 0.43∗ 99.99 0.43∗ 99.99
CIFAR bic. 0.25 96.49 0.25 96.57 0.25 96.60
CIFAR bic. 0.43∗ 99.99 0.43∗ 99.99 0.43∗ 99.99
GTSRB bil. 0.25 97.86 0.25 97.21 0.25 96.66
GTSRB bil. 0.48∗ 99.99 0.53∗ 99.99 0.55∗ 99.99
GTSRB bic. 0.25 97.15 0.25 95.89 0.25 94.97
GTSRB bic. 0.54∗ 99.99 0.57∗ 99.99 0.60∗ 99.99
7.1 Rotation of Images
We evaluate the robustness on ImageNet (Russakovsky et al., 2015), Restricted ImageNet (RIm-
ageNet)(Tsipras et al., 2019), CIFAR-10 (CIFAR) (Krizhevsky et al., 2009), the German Traffic
Sign Recognition Benchmark (GTSRB) (Stallkamp et al., 2012), and MNIST (LeCun et al., 1989).
For MNIST, CIFAR and GTSRB we use a ResNet-18 (He et al., 2016) and for (R)ImageNet a
ResNet-50. To account for interpolation noise, we use an `2-smoothed classifier trained with
SmoothAdvPGD (Salman et al., 2019a) and rotations as data augmentation. Details of the mod-
els and the training procedure is given in Appendix C.
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count
Figure 6: Histogram of the interpolation error for
rotation on ImageNet (blue) and the images in
ImageNet with shorter side > 2000 (red; counts
scaled up by 500×).
Attacker Model and Noise Bound The
bound on the interpolation error E can be com-
puted once we fix C, the range from which the
attacker chooses their angle γ and σγ , the stan-
dard deviation of the Gaussian used to smooth
over it, as well as the interpolation algorithm.
The computed bounds are given in Table 1.
For MNIST, we consider an attacker to per-
form rotations in [−180, 180] and for all other
datasets [−30, 30]. For datsets with small im-
age resolution (MNIST, CIFAR, GTSRB), we
only evaluate bilinear and bicubic interpola-
tion, as nearest neighbor interpolation could be
trivially enumerated. While it has also been
shown that enumeration can also be applied
to ImageNet (Pei et al., 2017), we show that
our approach can be an efficient alternative for
larger angels. For all datasets we employ a low-
pass filter and vignetting to further reduce E.
On all datasets we assume that the image is
saved in a loss-less integer format by the at-
tack and account for this in the estimate of E.
For CIFAR and GTSRB, we used k-smoothing
and estimate the interpolation error for each
color channel.
We observed the interpolation error to increase relative to the size of the image for small
images. This is problematic for two reasons, (i) it is harder to certify large noise radii, and (ii) as
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Table 2: We evaluated rotation on MNIST, RImageNet and ImageNet on 100 samples each and
CIFAR and GTSRB on 50 each. † indicates that we could prove a larger radius, but clipped the
value due to the attacker model, as otherwise the noise estimate might be incorrect. × mean not
applicable as we evaluate on a different machine, but similar to GTSRB.
Rotation rγ percentile
Dataset I σγ αγ f Acc. g Acc. 25th 50th 75th T [s] nγ n
MNIST bil. 180 0.001 0.99 0.81 86.64 180† 180† 10.15 200 200
MNIST bil. 90 0.001 0.99 0.81 31.00 55.22 90† 10.11 200 200
MNIST bic. 180 0.001 0.99 0.70 95.18 180† 180† 10.13 200 200
MNIST bic. 90 0.001 0.99 0.82 32.36 56.77 153.11 10.13 50 2000
RImageNet bil. 10 0.001 0.84 0.78 15.64 16.01 16.01 128.65 50 2000
RImageNet bil. 30 0.001 0.84 0.68 27.46 30† 30† 160.655 50 2000
RImageNet bic. 10 0.001 0.84 0.82 10.39 10.39 10.39 124.02 50 2000
RImageNet bic. 30 0.001 0.84 0.69 26.29 30† 30† 115.655 50 2000
ImageNet bil. 10 0.001 0.39 0.29 10.81 10.81 10.81 128.95 50 2000
ImageNet bil. 10 0.001 0.39 0.29 18.29 18.29 18.29 720.93 300 2000
ImageNet bil. 30 0.001 0.39 0.28 9.09 16.59 28.60 128.21 50 2000
ImageNet bil. 30 0.001 0.39 0.28 20.22 25.36 30† 753.72 50 2000
ImageNet bic. 10 0.001 0.39 0.29 10.40 10.40 10.40 143.75 50 2000
ImageNet bic. 30 0.001 0.39 0.27 9.33 17.00 28.74 141.59 50 2000
ImageNet near. 10 0.001 0.39 0.29 9.62 9.62 9.62 118.28 50 2000
ImageNet near. 30 0.001 0.39 0.26 7.38 16.63 27.72 118.53 50 2000
GTSRB bil. 30 0.01 0.68 0.14 12.61 12.61 12.61 661.50 20 30, 40, 600
CIFAR bil. 30 0.01 0.80 0.12 5.19 5.19 10.08 −× 20 40, 50, 600
noted by Cohen et al. (2019), smoothing with Gaussian Noise performs worse on smaller images.
To address this issue, we assume images from CIFAR to be resized to 64× 64 (from 32× 32) prior
to rotation (i.e., this is part of the attacker model); for GTSRB, which has images ranging in size
from 15 × 15 to 222 × 193, we use the same scheme as for CIFAR and for (R)ImageNet (where
images range in size from 20 × 17 to 7056 × 4488) we resize all images prior to rotations such
that their shorter side is 2000 pixels. This simulates a dataset where each image has at least a
resolution of 2000 × 2000, which we believe to be reasonable given current hardware. Thus our
attacker model formally is an attacker that applies rotation of γ ∈ C degrees, on an image of at
least 2000× 2000 pixels, that follow the data distribution. For error estimation and classification
we resize the images back down to 32×32 for GTSRB and CIFAR and for (R)ImageNet such that
the shorter side is 256 pixel long and take a 224×224 crop of the center, the common preprocessing
for this datset (Krizhevsky et al., 2012). Values in Table 1 take prepossessing into account. Fig. 6
shows the interpolation errors on ImageNet in blue for all images in red for images where the
shorter side is naturally longer than 2000. This indicates that we don’t measure an effect the
resclaing but rather the image size.
Entries of Table 1 marked with ∗ denote the maximal error measured for the dataset and the
perturbation. However, they lie just outside what we could prove with reasonable effort while
retaining accuracy. Thus in practice we use a slightly smaller E, that still covers  90% of
possible interpolation errors. This approach soundly certifies against attacks from an attacker
that randomly chooses an angle, as we observed that errors beyond the chosen E are rare and
empirically where not concentrated on particular images. Section 6 discusses the estimation of
E for a sound classifier. First estimate for these values show that they are similar to the values
reported in Table 1.
Results We evaluated our algorithm on the non-starred E values in Table 1. The results are
shown in Table 2: f Acc. and g Acc. denote how many images have been successfully classified
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Table 3: We evaluated translation on 100 samples each. † indicates that we could prove a much
larger radius, but clipped the value due to the attacker model, as otherwise the noise estimate
might be wrong.
Translation rγ percentile
Dataset I σγ αγ f Acc. g Acc. 25th 50th 75th T [s] nγ n
MNIST bil. 4 0.001 0.99 0.96 14.28%† 14.28%† 14.28%† 10.11 200 1000
MNIST bic. 4 0.001 0.99 0.98 14.28%† 14.28%† 14.28%† 10.12 200 1000
RImageNet bil. 50 0.001 0.80 0.79 2.4% 2.4% 2.4% 66.75 50 2000
RImageNet bic. 50 0.001 0.80 0.79 2.4% 2.4% 2.4% 147.35 50 2000
ImageNet bil. 50 0.001 0.48 0.36 2.4% 2.4% 2.4% 106.24 50 2000
ImageNet bic. 50 0.001 0.48 0.36 2.4% 2.4% 2.4% 149.40 50 2000
respectively. All images classified by g are certified with a radius rγ > 0. For ImageNet and
RImageNet as well as MNIST we observe very good results, as these datasets either have very
large images or are very simple and can sometimes prove radii that are larger than what we used
as possible ranges for the attacker when estimating E. We have clipped these values back to what
we assumed in the attacker model and indicate this by †. For GTSRB and CIFAR, the images
are yielding higher interpolation errors but at the same time are less robustness to noise. Thus
it becomes harder to construct a `2 smoothed classifier for these datasets. This required us to
drop the confidence from 99.9% to 99% and apply smoothing over each color channel separately.
Balunovic et al. (2019) certify 87.8% on MNIST, (±30◦, 35s per image) and again 87.8% on
CIFAR-10, (±10◦, 117s per image), with out taking rounding into account. Pei et al. (2017) need
on ±2 degrees 714s per image and report the failure rate per image, hence not comparable. We
can certify 81% on MNIST, (often with ±180◦, 10s per image) and 69% on RImageNet, (often
with ±30◦, 231s per image). Parameter choices are discussed in Appendix C.
7.2 Translation
Table 4: Bound E for the interpolation error of
translations. Estimated with αE = 0.001.Values
for RImageNet are omitted as they are similar to
those for ImageNet.
Dataset I σγ C E qE
MNIST bil. 4 [−4, 4] 0.3 92.60
MNIST bic. 4 [−4, 4] 0.3 96.47
ImageNet bil. 50 [−50, 50] 0.9 97.00
ImageNet bic. 50 [−50, 50] 1.25 96.36
Similarly to rotations, we apply preprocessing
calculate estimates for E in Table 4. As Ima-
geNet images get cropped before classification
and MNIST images have black background, we
do not use vignetting. Since the interpola-
tion errors for translation are slightly higher
than for rotation, we only consider MNIST and
(R)ImageNet. On the other datasets the error
becomes infeasible large. Also we do not con-
sider nearest neighbor interpolation as it can be
easily enumerated here. Results are shown in
Table 3. The radius is given in percent of image
size. 14.28% on MNIST corresponds to 4 pixel
and 2.4 on 2000 pixels to 48. Since we obtain
a `2-bound, the radius reads as ‖ ( dxdy ) ‖2 ≤ rγ
where dx and dy are changes in respective di-
rections. Balunovic et al. (2019) certify 77%
on MNIST, (±2 pixels, 263s per image). We
significantly improve this result.
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7.3 Volume Change of Audio Signals
To evaluate our method on audio data we use the speech commands dataset (Warden, 2018),
which are recordings of up to 1 second of people saying one of 30 different words, which are to
be classified. Our audio experiments are similar to those for images, although here we do not
employ any resizing or scaling. We use a classification pipeline that converts audio wave forms
into MFCC spectra (Davis & Mermelstein, 1980) and then treats these as images and applies
normal image classification. We use a ResNet50, that was trained with Gaussian noise, but not
SmoothAdvPGD. We apply the noise before the wavefrom is converted to the MFCC spectrum.
We estimate E with αE = 0.001, σγ = 3, C = [−3, 3] to be 0.005 and qE = 0.95. On 100
samples, the base classifier f was correct 94 times, and the smoothed classifier g 51 times for rγ of
0.75, 1.96 and 3.12 for the 25th, 50th, 75th percentile respectively, corresponding to ±1.09, ±1.25
and ±1.43 dB. At nγ = 100 and n = 400 the average certification time was 138.06s.
7.4 Discussion
Since the success of our approach largely depends on the size of the underlying images we are
in an unusual situation where it is easier for us to prove statements on ImageNet than CIFAR.
Accuracy of our robust classifier is mostly limited by the large estimate of E and the quality of
the underlying `p certification. Thus any advances in `p robustness or estimating lower (sound) E
(e.g., by computing it per image) directly translate into improvements of our method. The choice
of σγ trades accuracy with certification radius as seen in Table 2. Finally, using more samples
and further splits for k-smoothing, the error bound can be pushed further, at the cost of compute
time and accuracy.
8 Conclusion
In this work we presented a novel method that extends the Gaussian Smoothing framework of
Cohen et al. (2019) to semantic parameterized perturbations (beyond lp-balls) in domains such as
image (including ImageNet) and audio classification. The framework is general and can be directly
applied as-is to standard semantic perturbations with all interpolation schemes while being sound
for different types of pixel values. We believe the generality of the method will trigger further
work in this direction.
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Supplementary Material for
Certification of Semantic Perturbations via Randomized Smoothing
A Interpolations
In this section, we discuss three common interpolation methods used to compute a pixel value on
a unit square [0, 1]× [0, 1] lying between 4 pixels of an image. We describe the image around the
unit square by a function f : Z × Z → [0, 1]. We denote the interpolation on the unit square by
p : [0, 1]× [0, 1]→ [0, 1].
Nearest neighbour interpolation Nearest neighbor interpolation assigns a point in the unit
square the value of the nearest corner point of the unit square, that is,
p(x, y) :=

f(0, 0) if x, y < 12
f(0, 1) if x < 12 ≤ y
f(1, 0) if y < 12 ≤ x
f(1, 1) otherwise.
Bilinear interpolation Bilinear interpolation is described by a multivariate polynomial p(x, y) :=∑1
i,j=0 aijx
iyj such p(k, l) = f(k, l) for all k, l ∈ {0, 1}, that is
p(x, y) := f(0, 0)(1− x)(1− y) + f(0, 1)(1− x)y + f(1, 0)x(1− y) + f(1, 1)xy
Bicubic interpolation We know the values f(i, j) for i, j ∈ {−1, 0, 1, 2}. Further we define
fx(k, l) :=
1
2 (f(k + 1, l)− f(k − 1, l))
fy(k, l) :=
1
2 (f(k, l + 1)− f(k, l − 1))
fx,y(k, l) :=
1
2 (fx(k, l + 1)− fx(k, l − 1)) = 12 (fy(k + 1, l)− fx(k − 1, l))
for k, l ∈ {0, 1}. We can now fit the multivariate polynomial p(x, y) := ∑3i,j=0 aijxiyj such
that p(k, l) = f(k, l), ∂xp(k, l) = fx(k, l), ∂yp(k, l) = fy(k, l) and ∂xyp(k, l) = fxy(k, l) for all
k, l ∈ {0, 1}.
B Proof of Theorem 4.2
We present and proof a slightly more general version of Theorem 4.2.
Theorem. Let x ∈ Rn, f : Rm → Y be a classifier, ψβ : Rn → Rm a composable transformation
for β ∼ N (0,Σ) with a symmetric, positive-definite covariance matrix Σ ∈ Rk×k. If
Pβ(f ◦ ψβ(x) = cA) = pA ≥ pA ≥ pB ≥ pB = max
cB 6=cA
Pβ(f ◦ ψβ(x) = cB),
then g ◦ ψγ(x) = cA for all γ satisfying√
γTΣ−1γ < 12 (Φ
−1(pA)− Φ−1(pB)) =: rγ .
Proof. The assumption is
P ((f ◦ ψβ) (x) = cA) = pA ≥ pA ≥ pB ≥ pB = P ((f ◦ ψβ) (x) = cB) .
By the definition of g we need to show that
P ((f ◦ ψβ+γ) (x) = cA) ≥ P ((f ◦ ψβ+γ) (x) = cB) .
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We define the set A := {z | γTΣ−1z ≤
√
γTΣ−1γΦ(pA)}. We claim that for β ∼ N (0,Σ), we
have
P(β ∈ A) = pA (1)
P(f ◦ ψβ+γ(x) = cA) ≥ P(β + γ ∈ A). (2)
First, we show that Eq. (1) holds.
P(β ∈ A) = P(γTΣ−1β ≤
√
γTΣ−1γΦ(pA))
= P(γTΣ−1N (0,Σ) ≤
√
γTΣ−1γΦ(pA))
= P(γT
√
Σ−1N (0,1) ≤
√
γTΣ−1γΦ(pA))
= P(N (0, γTΣ−1γ) ≤
√
γTΣ−1γΦ(pA))
= P(
√
γTΣ−1γN (0, 1) ≤
√
γTΣ−1γΦ(pA))
= P(N (0, 1) ≤ Φ(pA))
= Φ(Φ−1(pA))
= pA
Thus Eq. (1) holds. Next we show that Eq. (2) holds. For a random variable v ∼ N (µv,Σv)
we write pv(z) for the evaluation of the Gaussian cdf at point z.
P(f ◦ ψβ+γ(x) = cA)− P(β + γ ∈ A)
=
∫
Rd
[f ◦ ψz = cA] pβ+γ(z)dz −
∫
A
pβ+γ(z)dz
=
∫
Rd\A
[f ◦ ψz(x) = cA] pβ+γ(z)dz +
∫
A
[f ◦ ψz(x) = cA] pβ+γ(z)dz −
∫
A
pβ+γ(z)dz
=
∫
Rd\A
[f ◦ ψz(x) = cA] pβ+γ(z)dz +
∫
A
[f ◦ ψz(x) = cA] pβ+γ(z)dz
−
(∫
A
[f ◦ ψz(x) = cA] pβ+γ(z)dz +
∫
A
[f ◦ ψz(x) 6= cA] pβ+γ(z)dz
)
=
∫
Rd\A
[f ◦ ψz(x) = cA] pβ+γ(z)dz −
∫
A
[f ◦ ψz(x) 6= cA] pβ+γ(z)dz
Lemma B.1≥ t
(∫
Rd\A
[f ◦ ψz(x) = cA] pβ(z)dz −
∫
A
[f ◦ ψz(x) 6= cA] pβ(z)dz
)
= t
(∫
Rd
[f ◦ ψz(x) = cA] pβ(z)dz −
∫
A
pβ(z)dz
)
Eq. (1)
≥ 0.
Thus also Eq. (2) holds.
Next, we claim that for B := {z | γTΣ−1z ≥
√
γTΣ−1γΦ−1(1− pB)} holds that
P(f ◦ ψβ(x) = cB) ≤ P(β ∈ B) (3)
P(f ◦ ψβ+γ(x) = cB) ≤ P(β + γ ∈ B) (4)
The proof for Eq. (3) and Eq. (4) are analogous to the proofs for Eq. (1) and Eq. (2).
18
Now we derive the conditions that lead to P(β + γ ∈ A) > P(β + γ ∈ B):
P(β + γ ∈ A) = P
(
γTΣ−1(β + γ) ≤
√
γTΣ−1γΦ−1(pA)
)
= P
(
γTΣ−1(Σ
1
2N (0,1) + γ) ≤
√
γTΣ−1γΦ−1(pA)
)
= P
(
γT
√
Σ−1N (0,1) + γTΣ−1γ ≤
√
γTΣ−1γΦ−1(pA)
)
= P
(√
γTΣ−1γN (0,1) + γTΣ−1γ ≤
√
γTΣ−1γΦ−1(pA)
)
= P
(
N (0,1) +
√
γTΣ−1γ ≤ Φ−1(pA)
)
= P
(
N (0,1) ≤ Φ−1(pA)−
√
γTΣ−1γ
)
= Φ(Φ−1(pA)−
√
γTΣ−1γ)
Similarly, we have
P(β + γ ∈ B) = P
(
N (0,1) ≥ Φ−1(1− pB)−
√
γTΣ−1γ
)
= Φ(
√
γTΣ−1γ − Φ−1(1− pB))
Thus, we get
P(β + γ ∈ A) > P(β + γ ∈ B)
⇔ Φ(Φ−1(pA)−
√
γTΣ−1γ) > Φ(
√
γTΣ−1γ − Φ−1(1− pB))
⇔ Φ−1(pA)−
√
γTΣ−1γ >
√
γTΣ−1γ − Φ−1(1− pB)
⇔ Φ−1(pA) + Φ−1(1− pB) > 2
√
γTΣ−1γ
⇔ 12 (Φ−1(pA)− Φ−1(pB)) >
√
γTΣ−1γ.
From this directly follows the statement of the theorem. Setting Σ = σ21 recovers the satement
of Theorem 4.2.
Next we show the lemma used in the proof.
Lemma B.1. There exists t > 0 such that pβ+γ(z) ≤ pβ(z) · t for all z ∈ A. And further
pβ+γ(z) > pβ(z) · t for all z ∈ Rd \A.
Proof.
pβ+γ(z)
pβ(z)
= exp
(− 12 (z − γ)TΣ−1(z − γ) + 12zTΣ−1z)
= exp
(− 12zTΣ−1z + zTΣ−1γ − 12γTΣ−1γ + 12zTΣ−1z)
= exp
(
zTΣ−1γ − 12γTΣ−1γ
)
What is the lowest t if it exists such that
pβ+γ(z)
pβ(z)
≤ t?
pβ+γ(z)
pβ(z)
≤ t
⇔ exp (zTΣ−1γ − 12γTΣ−1γ) ≤ t
⇔ zTΣ−1γ − 12γTΣ−1γ ≤ log t
⇔ zTΣ−1γ ≤ log t+ 12γTΣ−1γ
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Because z ∈ A, we know that
zTΣ−1γ ≤
√
γTΣ−1γΦ−1(pA).
Does there exist a t such that both upper bound coincide? Yes, namely
t = exp
(√
γTΣ−1γΦ−1(pA)− 12γTΣ−1γ
)
.
C Experiment Details
C.1 Models
We have implemented the training for all models in robustness-lib (Engstrom et al., 2019) in
PyTorch (Paszke et al., 2017).
(Restricted) ImageNet We used ResNet-50 (He et al., 2016) and trained with SmoothAdvPGD
(Salman et al., 2019a). We trained with a batch size of 200 for 90 (150 for ImageNet with rotation)
epochs using stochastic gradient decent with a learning rate starting at 0.1, which is decreased
by a factor 10 every 30 (50 for ImageNet with rotation) epochs. For each batch of samples we
apply a randomized data augmentation, vignetting for rotation, and the lowpass filter. After this
prepossessing we then apply SmoothAdvPGD with one noise sample (σ = 0.5) and 1 PGD pass
(with step size 1; as in Salman et al. (2019a)) and then evaluate or train on the batch.
We trained either with random rotation (uniformly in [−30, 30] degrees; with bilinear interpo-
lation) or random translations up to ±5.36% in x and y direction (again uniformly with bilinear
interpolation).
For the lowpass filter we use a bandwidth of 50.
Training on ImageNet with 4 GeForce RTX 2080 Tis and a 16-core node of aw Intel(R) Xeon(R)
Gold 6242 CPU @ 2.80GHz takes roughly 1 hour per epoch and Restricted ImageNet 10 minutes
per epoch.
CIFAR-10 & German Traffic Sign Recognition Benchmark (GTSRB) For both datasets
we use a ResNet-18 trained on 32 × 32 images. We use the same pipeline as for ImageNet, but
with σ = 0.12, PGD step size 0.25, batch size 128, and lowered the learning rate every 70 epochs
over 500 total epochs. For both datasets we used data augementation with ±30 degree rotations.
Training with 2 GeForce RTX 2080 Tis and a 16-core node of aw Intel(R) Xeon(R) Gold 6242
CPU @ 2.80GHz takes 36s for CIFAR and 15s for GTSRB per epoch.
For the lowpass filter we use a bandwidth of 12.
MNIST For MNIST we use a ResNet-18 (that takes a single color channel in the input layer),
which we trained with σ = 0.3, PGD step size 0.2, batch size 1024, and initial learning rate 0.01
over 300 epochs, lowering the learning rate every 60 epochs.
For data augmentation we used rotations in [−180, 180] degrees and translations of ±0.28%.
For the lowpass filter we use a bandwidth of 8.
Training with 2 GeForce RTX 2080 Tis and a 16-core node of aw Intel(R) Xeon(R) Gold 6242
CPU @ 2.80GHz takes 10s per epoch.
GCommands In addition to robustness-lib we based our implementation on GCommandsPytorch
(GCo). As outlined in Section 7 we convert the audio waveform to MFCC spectra (Davis & Mer-
melstein, 1980) and then treats these as images and applies normal image classification, with a
single color channel. For this we utilize a ResNet-50. We apply Gaussian Noise with σ = 0.006
on the wave form during training, but do not employ SmoothAdvPGD, which would necessitate
a differentiable MFCC transform. During training we also perform random volume changes with
±10 dB. Training is performed using SGD over 90 epochs, where the fixed learning rate is 0.01.
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C.2 Experiment Parameters
To obtain the parameters for smoothing we calculated the minimum number of samples required
in the best case (classifier always reports the same class). These numbers rounded up yields the
parameters used in Section 7.
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